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FROM: BONN

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3449, MAY 20, 6 PM

SENT DEPARTMENT 3449, REPEATED INFORMATION LONDON 403,
PARIS 620.

FROM BRUCE

CHANCELLOR TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT AS REPORTED IN TODAY'S FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE THE SPD CONVENTION AT STUTTGART WAS MAKING OPPOSITION TO FEDREP NUCLEAR ARMAMENT ITS PARAMOUNT POLICY. OLLENHAUER AND CARLO SCHMID HAD SPOKEN VIGOROUSLY ON SUBJECT. SINCE SPD HAS DIFFERENCES OF OPINIONS WITHIN PARTY RANKS ON OTHER ISSUES IT HAS DECIDED TO CONCENTRATE ON THIS, AND RESULTS THUS FAR ARE MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN ADENAUER EXPECTED.

THEREFORE HE SAID HE MUST FIND A NEW "FORMULA" TO DEAL WITH THIS TENET. HE HAS NOT YET DECIDED EXACTLY HOW TO PHRASE IT, BUT READ ME POINTS FROM TENTATIVE DRAFT WHICH, IF AND WHEN FINALIZED, WILL BE DISTRIBUTED FOR GUIDANCE TO CDU SPEAKERS PARTICIPATING IN NORTH RHINE WESTPHALIAN CAMPAIGN. (CHANCELLOR ALREADY SPOKE ALONG THESE LINES IN HIS DORTMUND SPEECH MAY 18.)

1. FEDREP ARMED FORCES NOW HAVE NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
2. MATADORS BOUGHT IN U.S. ARE MEANS OF DELIVERY BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT WILL REMAIN FOR 18 TO 24 MONTHS ON U.S. WHERE GERMAN PERSONNEL WILL BE TRAINED IN THEIR USE.
3. IF WITHIN 18 TO 24 MONTHS NO START HAS BEEN MADE ON DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT FEDREP WILL BE FORCED TO STATION MATADORS ON ITS TERRITORY BUT WARHEADS WILL BE UNDER SHAPE OR U.S. CUSTODY.

CONTINUING, HE SAID THERE WILL BE FIVE LAND ELECTIONS THIS YEAR
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AND OUTCOME WILL DETERMINE CONTROL BUNDES RAT. FOR CAMPAIGN PURPOSES, AS WELL AS OTHER REASONS, HE MUST HAVE SUMMIT CONFERENCE OR ELSE CLEAR DEMONSTRATION TO PUBLIC OPINION SOVIETS RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING IT IMPOSSIBLE. HE KNOWS MACMILLAN IS IN FULL ACCORD ON THIS AND HE BELIEVES PFLIMLIN ALSO.

HE SAID SOVIETS THINK CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN STATE DEPARTMENT HAVE NO REAL DESIRE FOR SUMMIT CONFERENCE. DESPITE ERRATIC TACTICS CHANCELLOR CONVINCED KHRUSHCHEV WANTS SUCH MEETING SINCE HIS MOTIVES ARE UNCHANGING AND HE NEEDS "HALO" LIGHTING HEADS OF GATHERING TO SUSTAIN HIS POSITION DOMESTICALLY.

IF IMPRESSION SHOULD PREVAIL IN EUROPE THAT U.S. HAD BLOCKED SUMMIT MEETING, THIS WOULD CREATE UNFAVORABLE REACTION AND SERIOUSLY IMPAIR U.S. PRESTIGE. IN FEDREP REGARDLESS OF PARTY THERE IS STRONG DESIRE U.S. PRESTIGE SHOULD NOT THUS SUFFER. HE STRESSED GREAT IMPORTANCE BE ASCRIBED TO HIS OWN ATTACHMENT TO U.S. AND TO SECRETARY.

NOW FOR HIS OTHER FEARS. IN COPENHAGEN TALKING TO BRENTANO, SECRETARY HAD REFERRED ONLY TO NUCLEAR WEAPON AND ROCKET DISARMAMENT BUT AMBASSADOR BURGESS IN RECENT STATEMENTS HAS INCLUDED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH PLEASES CHANCELLOR. ALSO AT COPENHAGEN SECRETARY HAD INSISTED ON REUNIFICATION BEING ONE OF CHIEF TOPICS FOR SUMMIT DISCUSSION, BUT YESTERDAY BLANKENHORN INFORMED HIM U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD NOW DROPPED THIS POINT. WITHIN TWO WEEKS RAPID AND BASIC CHANGES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE AS SO ILLUSTRATED MAKE HIM UNEASY OVER STEADINESS OF U.S. POLICY. ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS HE HAD SAID COPENHAGEN POSITION OF SECRETARY WAS THE CORRECT ONE, NAMELY THAT CONTROLLED GENERAL DISARMEMENT IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN GERMAN REUNIFICATION THOUGH THE LATTER MUST ALSO BE INSISTED UPON. HOWEVER, BY CONTINUING TO STRESS REUNIFICATION IN CONNECTION WITH SOVIETS VIOLATING 1955 GENEVA COMPACT U.S. IS CREATING UNNECESSARILY BAD ATMOSPHERE FOR NEGOTIATIONS, AND MACMILLAN AGREES ON THIS.

IN REGARD TO ABOVE WHICH IS ALMOST LITERAL TRANSCRIPT OF CHANCELLOR'S SOMEWHAT RAMBLING OBSERVATIONS, I FELT OBLIGED TO INTERVENE AT VARIOUS POINTS, AS HAS PROVED NECESSARY ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, TO TRY TO CORRECT SOME OF HIS ERRONEOUS IMPRESSIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, I SAID NOBODY IN U.S. GOVT HAD DEVIATED FROM COPENHAGEN

CONCLUSIONS

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CONCLUSIONS WHICH HE HAD APPROVED, AND ASKED WHETHER BLANKENHORN HAD CITED ANY AUTHORITY FOR HIS STATEMENT ABOUT OUR ALLEGED CHANGES ON REUNIFICATION. HE SAID HE HAD NOT. I SUGGESTED HE EXAMINE FURTHER INTO THIS SINCE I CONSIDERED OUR POLICY HAD BEEN CONSTANT AND CONSISTENT. WE HAD ALWAYS INSISTED ON ADEQUATE PREPARATIONS; DID THE CHANCELLOR NOW BELIEVE THEM UNNECESSARY? HIS ANSWER WAS IN NEGATIVE, BUT WE WERE BEING TOO INSISTENT ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE LAST TIME I HAD SEEN HIM HE HAD EMPHASIZED (AS HE HAS DONE IN SPEECHES) HIS DESIRE TO HAVE THAT TOPIC INCLUDED UNDER HEADING OF "RELAXATION OF TENSIONS". HE AGREED HE HAD DONE SO, AND STILL FAVORED IT, BUT KNEW THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT DISCUSS IT. HE WANDERED OFF ABOUT DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN LEWIS STRAUSS AND THE DEPARTMENT ON CESSATION OF TESTS. I TOLD HIM I HAD READ OF SUCH ALLEGED DIFFERENCES IN NEWSPAPERS, AND CONSIDERED ON SUCH A CRITICAL SUBJECT THERE COULD BE VARYING VIEWS AS THERE WERE AMONGST SCIENTISTS, BUT ONCE OUR GOVERNMENTAL POSITION WAS ESTABLISHED AND OUR ALLIES INFORMED AND CONSULTED THERE WOULD BE A FULLY SUPPORTED NATIONAL BASIS FOR DEALING WITH SOVIETS ON THIS ASPECT OF DISARMAMENT.

THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL MORE OF THE SAME WHICH EXPOSED SOME OF HIS INCONSISTENCIES UNTIL HE GOT OFF ON THE SUBJECT OF THE MIDDLE EAST, THE TURKISH FINANCIAL SITUATION (DID I KNOW WHETHER THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER WAS DISLIKED IN OEEC), AND HIS SUPPOSITION THAT THE FRENCH ARMY UNITS IN FRANCE WOULD BE LOYAL TO PFLIMLIN.

IN VIEW OF THE NATURE OF THIS AND MY TWO PRECEDING CONVERSATIONS WITH HIM (EMBTel TO DEPT 3410 MAY 15, AND EMBTEL TO COPENHAGEN 65 MAY 6) AND HIS LONG MESSAGE TO THE SECRETARY DELIVERED IN BERLIN, ONE MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO CONCLUDE WE WILL HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CHANCELLOR. I AM INCLINED TO DISCOUNT THIS. HE IS VERY CHANGEABLE, IMPRESSIONABLE AND SENSITIVE, ESPECIALLY TO NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AND GOSSIP, REGARDLESS OF THEIR LACK OF VERACITY. HOWEVER, HIS SUSPICIOUSNESS AND IMPULSIVENESS WILL FROM TIME TO TIME CAUSE US REAL TROUBLE, AND NECESSITATE SOOTHING MESSAGES, AS WELL AS MUCH PATIENT LISTENING.

1. I FEEL HE IS RELYING LESS AND LESS ON CONSULTATION WITH HIS FONMIN AND ASSOCIATES REGARDING FOREIGN AFFAIRS WHICH WILL MAKE

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WILL MAKE HIM MORE UNPREDICTABLE.

2. MENTALLY, HE APPEARS VERY ALERT BUT IS RATHER REPETITIVE AND DIFFUSE.

IN THE LAST ANALYSIS, I BELIEVE HE WILL ALWAYS SUPPORT OUR MAJOR EUROPEAN POLICIES, CERTAINLY AS DEFINED UP TO PRESENT. AS ALWAYS, HE SEEMS IN EXCELLENT PHYSICAL HEALTH AND IN FINE SPIRITS, EVEN WHILE EXPRESSING HIS APPREHENSIONS.

BRUCE

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